
Alternative Epistemologies

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Alternative Epistemologies

The presumption that epistemology as it has traditionally been defined is a neutral and universalist theory of cognitive norms and standards has recently come under increasing attack by feminist philosophers. Though there are significant divergences in the diagnoses offered of the deficiencies of orthodox epistemology, and corresponding variations in the positive proposals advanced for its improvement or supersession, a clear consensus has now been established that some kind of "feminist epistemology" is called for.¹ A parallel critique has also come from some black philosophers, who have argued that philosophy has not been immune to the racism that has pervaded so much of Western thought about non-European peoples.² The literature here, however, is not remotely as extensive as that for the feminist case, reflecting the continuing under-representation of black scholars in the field.³ Finally, there is, of course, the longstanding challenge of the Marxist political tradition, which some theorists at least have taken to be committed to the epistemic superiority of the "proletarian" to the "bourgeois" standpoint in comprehending the world.⁴

In all three cases, then, we have the advocacy of what could be termed "alternative epistemologies," in that the processes of cognizing validated by the dominant perspective are being characterized as somehow inadequate.

What I want to do in this paper is to examine and elucidate some of the major arguments offered for and against the legitimacy of such epistemologies. But a preliminary clarification (and perhaps also a justification) is necessary for those not acquainted with the literature. The proponents of such views do not, for the most part, see themselves as offering, within the conventional framework, alternative analyses of such traditional epistemological topics as memory, perception, truth, belief, and so on, or coming up with startling new solutions to the Gettier problem. Nor is their paradigmatic cognizer that familiar Cartesian figure, the abstract, disembodied, individual knower, beset by skeptical and solipsist hazards, trying to establish a reliable cognitive relationship with the basic furniture of the Universe.⁵ Rather, the sentiment tends to be that this framework itself needs to be transcended, and that the stand-

ard, hallowed array of "problems" in the field should itself be seen as problematic. Thus a destructive genealogical inquiry underpins part of their recommended reconceptualization, the suggestion being that certain issues have only historically been seen as problems in the first place because of the privileged universalization of the experience and outlook of a very limited (particularistic) sector of humanity—largely white, male, and propertied.

It can readily be appreciated, therefore, that such arguments, or assertions, would be unlikely to impress the average subscriber to *Mind*. They would be seen as question-begging, as presupposing that all the important issues have been settled. And it might be felt that such epistemologies—if the title is even conceded to them—do not therefore deal with the really serious, basic philosophical questions: the existence of the external world and of other minds, the reliability of perception, the trustworthiness of memory.

But the following challenge could be mounted to orthodox dismissiveness: how serious is this seriousness really? If the focus of these alternative epistemologies is admittedly on less fundamental beliefs, is this not redeemed by genuine rather than histrionic questioning? Hume pointed out long ago that, whatever skeptical iconoclasm with respect to everyday beliefs philosophers may indulge in privately (or with their colleagues), "immediately upon leaving their closets, [they] mingle with the rest of mankind in those exploded opinions."⁶ Nor is this necessarily just a matter of expedient conformity with the unenlightened herd, for he admits in his own case that after a few hours at backgammon, when he tries to "return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strain'd, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any farther."⁷ So one could be forgiven for suggesting that much of mainstream epistemology's apparent intellectual radicalism and daring about foundational beliefs is purely ritualistic and (literally) academic, having no practical implications for the actual beliefs and behavior either of the non-philosophical population at large or even of the philosophers themselves. But if this diagnosis is correct, and it is in fact just, or largely, a sterile conceptual game, then why should it be seen as intrinsically a more serious undertaking than the project of these alternative epistemologies: the genuine (not simulated) revolutionizing and

reconstruction of our received, hegemonically commonsensical picture of social reality?

Such, at any rate, could be one possible line of defense of the validity of these epistemologies. Characteristically, then, their concerns will be not the problem of other minds, but the problem of why women were not thought to have minds; not an investigation of the conditions under which individual memory is reliable, but an investigation of the social conditions under which systematic historical amnesia about the achievements of African civilizations became possible; not puzzlement about whether or not physical objects exist, but puzzlement about the cognitive mechanisms which make relational social properties appear under capitalism as reified intrinsic natural properties. In what follows, I will try to clarify some of their crucial theoretical commonalities as well as their differences.

1.

As Alan Soble has pointed out,⁸ two fundamentally different kinds of answers have been offered to the question of why subordinate groups may have differential, and superior, insight into the structure of social reality: (i) There are biological differences in the cognizing equipment, or the embodied interaction with the world, of the different groups involved; and (ii) there are significant socially-caused divergences in their situation which differentially affect their perception. Our main focus will be on the latter, more prominent, claim, but a few words on the biological answer would not be inappropriate, if only to establish it as a foil.

The basic notion here is that traditionally subordinated groups, such as women and blacks, have an innately superior cognizing apparatus, and so can better know the world than the dominant group of white males. (A democratized, "environmentalist" variation on this position would be that all humans have the potential for these capacities to develop, but that the respective circumstances of subordination and domination have fostered their flourishing/atrophy.) What is involved, then, is a kind of "left" biological

determinism, which has been embraced both by radical feminists and by some sectors of the black nationalist movement.

Alison Jaggar, for example, cites the work of radical feminists who believe in female intuition, a female capacity to enter into a direct mystical connection with the world, and specifically female parapsychological powers such as "lonth."⁹ Similarly, Sandra Harding mentions the view that women's biological functions--menstruation, intercourse, pregnancy, nursing--afford them different kinds of experiences that are physiologically based.¹⁰ On parallel lines, some adherents of the black philosophy of negritude, developed by Aime' Cesaire and Leopold Senghor, have argued that there are characteristically black modes of cognition: "Senghor's theory of negritude ...contains within it a theory of knowledge, indeed an epistemology. The key notion in Senghor's theory is that of *emotion*, which he virtually erects into a function of knowledge and attributes to the African as a cardinal principle of his racial disposition."¹¹ And Harding cites more recent claims of the same kind, for example, that varying quantities of melanin, different sorts of amino acid, and divergent brain patterns "underlie cultural differences between Africans and Europeans."¹²

There are familiar, post-Kuhnian problems in evaluating these claims, since any reference to the meagerness or non-existence of their scientific basis is liable to be met with the accusation of *petitio*. Yet if the usual distinction between belief and knowledge is not to be abandoned (and those who are expressly challenging traditional belief-systems would seem to have a good reason for wanting to retain it), then claims to alternative and superior forms of noetic access would still have to cashed be out in fairly traditional ways to seem persuasive. It is not just a question here of convincing a white male audience (who might be dismissed as intellectually irredeemable anyway), but of winning over other women and blacks who do accept the standard paradigm, and with whom dialogue would presumably be seen as important. (Though perhaps some kind of direct approach to the awakening in others of these putatively dormant cognitive powers could render discursive proof unnecessary, the deed superseding the word.) Finally, it should be pointed out that these positions have often been criticized by other women and blacks as implicitly endorsing the

oppressor's theoretical framework. Thus Abiola Irele, summarizing some of the criticisms made of Senghor, comments: "Negritude is presented in these objections as not only too static to account for the diversified forms of concrete life in African societies but also, because of its 'biologism,' as a form of acquiescence in the ideological presuppositions of European racism."¹³

A more mundane basis for male/female cognitive distinctness would be sexual dimorphism in brain structure, since there is some indication that spatial and linguistic skills are not symmetrically distributed between the sexes.¹⁴ These findings have been taken by both feminists and anti-feminists to establish innate cognitive differentiation, one side seeing female and the other male superiority in the data. As Lorraine Code has pointed out, though, the fact that the brain develops its functions by practice means that, even if these differences can be unequivocally substantiated, the ultimate causes may still be social rather than biological. Pending the transformation of patriarchal structures, widespread and continuing stereotyping of gender roles for children makes it very difficult to separate what is truly innate from what is merely socialized.¹⁵

2.

We turn now to the major argument, that from social situation. This argument is best-developed within the Marxist tradition, and the most influential version of the "feminist epistemology" claims ("feminist standpoint" theories¹⁶) explicitly invokes that tradition, so this is the best place to begin. By now, of course, there are multitudinous Marxisms, not to mention post-Marxisms, but the variety which I think lends itself best to this project is the relatively old-fashioned (some would probably say, more harshly, "discredited") "scientific realist" interpretation of Marx. This interpretation sees Marx's appearance/reality dichotomy in *Capital* as a statement of the anti-positivist, realist insistence on the necessity for distinguishing between naively spontaneous and methodologically adequate conceptualizations of empirical data.¹⁷ Historical materialism would then be a theory of the workings of

the capitalist system which is--to cite some of the crucial scientific realist claims--objective, genuinely referential, and a better, more progressive approximation to truth than its predecessors.¹⁸ It is within this framework that I think the most plausible defense can be given of the validity of "alternative epistemologies," a defense which avoids epistemological relativism.

The argument goes something like this. Marx's theorization of society includes a meta-theoretical element, in that his general claims about the social determination of belief commit him to genetic explanations both of other important competing theories and, reflexively, of the origins of Marxism itself. Thus, in this respect, (though not, as I shall later contend, in others) he is in agreement with Barry Barnes's and David Bloor's insistence that there be a "symmetry" of explanation-schemes both for theories deemed scientific and theories deemed unscientific.¹⁹ The latter may, of course, have all kinds of causes, including idiosyncratic personal ones, but Marx's belief is that when it comes to the sociologically important patterns of long-term systematic error that affect significant sectors of the population, we should look for structurally-generated misperceptions that arise out of the social system itself. Now in *Capital*, there is a brief but illuminating passage where Marx argues that Aristotle was hindered, despite his great intellect, from seeing human labor as the foundation of all value because Greek slavery presumed "the inequality of men and of their labor-powers."²⁰ An implicit contrast with the later capitalist mode of production is involved here, for the suggestion seems to be that the low level of technological development, and the economic and ideological centrality of slavery, meant that there was no social group to whom the idea of human equality would "naturally" have occurred. So this particular societal illusion (innate human inequality) would have the whole society in its conceptual grip, with no countervailing ideational tendencies (or at least no "materially-based" ones). By contrast, Marx believes that the illusory appearances of capitalism--though admittedly exerting a certain doxastic pull on everybody--can be at least partially "seen through" from a certain perspective, that of course being the perspective of the working class. The account Marx gives is of an ostensibly abstract, non-gendered and non-racialized, capitalism,

so that his theoretical focus is on class-related illusions. But feminists and black nationalists can obviously argue that actually-existing sexist and racist capitalism (which of course does include the capitalist systems Marx studied) also generates other illusory appearances, which are not reducible to class, and which are differentially penetrable cognitively by other social groups. So the key claim in all cases is that social causation can have both positive and negative epistemic effects.²¹

This, then, is the central notion that has to be defended if the project of alternative epistemologies is to get off the ground: that social causation can be epistemologically beneficial. We need now to get clear on precisely what social characteristic is supposed to produce this superior insight. I think there are three main candidates, which are not always disentangled from one another: the oppression subordinate groups suffer, their potentially universal character, their differential experience.

We begin with "oppression." This is a broader term than "exploitation" (in the technical Marxist sense) and, as such, useful in that it can be extended to other groups besides the working class. It is also harder to define. Alison Jaggar suggests the following analysis: "oppression is the imposition of unjust constraints on the freedom of individuals or groups."²² She later goes on to argue that the suffering of oppressed groups is epistemically beneficial: "Their pain provides them with a motivation for finding out what is wrong, for criticizing accepted interpretations of reality and for developing new and less distorted ways of understanding the world."²³ But even if this tendency exists, there is also, as Jon Elster has pointed out, "the tendency of the oppressed and exploited classes in a society to believe in the justice of the social order that oppresses them."²⁴ So one has to be careful not to put too much explanatory weight on this: suffering itself is not necessarily cognitively illuminating. It is significant that Marx did not seem to think that the (clearly oppressed) slaves of ancient Greece were likely to make the cognitive leap to the notion of universal human equality. And it is a familiar fact that although several subordinate classes could be regarded as oppressed under capitalism--the petty bourgeoisie, the peasantry, the *lumpenproletariat*, and the working class--it was only in the last of these that Marx thought

a revolutionary consciousness was likely to develop. (For the *lumpenproletariat*, whose condition could be regarded as most miserable, he had nothing but contempt, seeing them as most prone to sell out to capital.) Thus Alan Soble, who takes "oppression" to be the crucial factor in the feminist claim, argues against it on the grounds that: "Each oppressed group (women, workers, blacks, chicanos, the handicapped, etc.) can make a claim to epistemological superiority," so that "the result is that the Marx-based epistemological argument...collapses into trivial pluralism."²⁵

I suggest, then, that the mere fact of oppression, though possibly producing an openness to alternate views, is not enough. Let us now look at universality. In Marx's early writings, the proletariat are characterized as "an estate which is the dissolution of all estates...which cannot emancipate itself without emancipating itself from all other spheres of society and thereby emancipating all other spheres of society."²⁶ A recent discussion by Joseph McCarney draws on this vision of totality: since the proletariat are the "universal class," "Marx was able to combine the necessity of social roots with the aspiration to the whole" because "the standpoint of the whole and that of the proletariat were identical in the historical circumstances of the time."²⁷ But for a non-Hegelian Marxism, the seemingly teleological causality of this claim is not readily convincing. Why should the future fact that a particular class will bring about a classless society retroactively guarantee them a holistic perspective? Elster's important recent book on Marx has emphasized the necessity for providing "microfoundations," specific causal mechanisms, for teleological and functional claims.²⁸ We would have to ask then: what causal mechanisms could plausibly be suggested that would make this hypothetical causality operable? Moreover, even if it is conceded that the proletariat come closest of all the classes of capitalism to a genuinely universalist viewpoint, this certainly does not exhaust the taxonomy of important social groups. The experiences of blacks and women with working-class racism and sexism, the frequently sectarian practices of vanguard Marxist groupings in relation to non-class struggles and issues, and the continuing under-representation of women in the upper echelons of the power structures of existing socialist states, all cast doubt on the actual "univer-

sality" of the proletarian perspective. And if a good case cannot be made for the working class, then *a fortiori* it is hardly likely to be made for blacks or women.

What we are left with, then, is differential group experience, and it is upon this foundation that I think the best case can be made for the cognitive superiority of alternative viewpoints. A metaphor that may be helpful is the notion of some kind of "experiential space," which is not homogeneous, but full of structured heterogeneities and discontinuities, so that a social dimension is built-in to its architecture from the start. As Bhikhu Parekh puts it:

A society is not a collection of individuals, but a system of positions.... To be a member of a society is to occupy a prestructured social space and to find oneself already related to others in a certain manner.... Since [one's] relations with other positions are objectively structured in a determinate manner, so are [one's] social experiences.... Since [one's] social experiences are structured, [one's] forms of thought, the categories in terms of which [one] perceives and interprets the social world, are also structured.²⁹

Far from it being the case, then, that the asocial Cartesian knower can move freely along all axes of this space, there will be certain resistances linked specifically to one's social characteristics, one's group membership, that will determine, at least tendentially, the kinds of experiences one is likely to have and the kinds of concepts one is accordingly likely to develop. In virtue of our common humanity there will obviously be a common ("universal") zone which will make the Cartesian project plausible in the first place; one must avoid the absurd kind of hyperbole which would suggest that there is no area of overlap at all between the experiences of different groups. But there will also be areas of experience that lie outside of the normal trajectory through the world of members of hegemonic groups. The claim that defenders of alternative epistemologies must make is that subordinate groups' access to these areas gives them a more veridical picture of the dynamics of the social system. If it doesn't strain the metaphor too much, a rough distinction could probably be made between experiences that are "outside" the hegemonic framework in the sense of involving an external geography (a muckraking Frederick Engels brings details

of British slum conditions to the shocked attention of a middle-class audience) and experiences that are "outside" because they redraw the map of what was thought to be already explored territory (feminists put forward the claim that most "seductions" have a coercive element that makes them more like rapes). Thus in the latter case there is a double shock, arising not merely from the simply alien, but from the alienated familiar, the presentation of the old from a new angle. It is this kind of inversion of perspective that is most characteristic of alternative epistemologies. Given the initial scientific realist assumptions, the argument must now be that these alternative sets of experiences are not epistemically indifferent *vis-à-vis* one another, but that hegemonic groups characteristically have experiences that foster illusory perceptions about society's functioning, while subordinate groups characteristically have experiences that (at least potentially) give rise to more adequate conceptualizations. It is not so much a question of simple oppression, then, but rather of an oppression so structured that epistemically enlightening experiences result from it.

At this stage, though, it may be argued that the foregoing account really overstates the degree of epistemic divergence between different perspectives. Granted that people will have differing views about things, there is no reason why we cannot learn, through communication, to understand that other person's viewpoint, and so achieve a more balanced perspective; to exaggerate these admitted differences into "alternative epistemologies" is really ridiculous. One problem with this kind of liberal approach is that it ignores the fact that because rival sets of experiences are often contradictory rather than complementary (as in perspective "inversion," for example), a simple synthesis is not really possible. In addition, it underestimates the difficulty members of hegemonic groups have in accepting alternative descriptions of their experienced reality. Apart from the *prima facie* appearance of the situation, already mentioned, there is also the contributory role of background hegemonic ideologies, which help to sustain a particular interpretation of what is happening, and to denigrate other viewpoints. Thus there will be a basic skepticism about conflicting reports. Sandra Harding points to "the struggle we have had to get women's testimony about rape, wife battering, sexual harass-

ment, and incest experiences accepted as reliable by police, the courts, employers, psychiatrists, other men and women, etc."³⁰ Moreover, in some cases reports will not even be forthcoming, since those in subordinate groups may judge it imprudent, given the power relations involved, to give an honest account of how they feel about things. The oral and literary history of the black experience, for example, is full of stories and parables which emphasize the necessity of dissembling before even apparently sincere and concerned whites, telling them what it is calculated they want to hear rather than the truth: the mask of the cheerful grin. Thus in a crucial episode at the beginning of Ralph Ellison's classic postwar novel, *Invisible Man*, the nameless narrator overhears (and is at the time bewildered by) his grandfather's deathbed advice to his father: "Son, after I'm gone I want you to keep up the good fight. I never told you, but our life is a war....I want you to overcome 'em with yeses, undermine 'em with grains, agree 'em to death and destruction."³¹ Finally, there will be psychological obstacles ("hot" mechanisms) to the acceptance of redescriptions which cast interpersonal transactions in terms of coercion and oppression, quite apart from the ("cold") skepticism which arises from the intrinsic incongruity of these reports with one's own hegemonic group-experience.³² It could be said that, if there are things one needs to know, then there are also things one needs not to know, and an interesting socio-psychological account could probably be constructed of mechanisms of societal blocking of unwanted information that would be the Marxist equivalent of the Freudian repression of unhappy memories. For all these reasons, then, members of hegemonic groups are in practice unlikely to be receptive to alternative viewpoints.

3.

Let us now look at some criticisms of this kind of approach that have recently been made by Jon Elster. Elster's basically positivist account of Marx is hostile to the idea that the notion of a "working-class perspective" has any merit, and this would presumably extend, *a fortiori*, to any similar claims made by women and

blacks. He sees as Marx's "most original contribution" to the theory of cognitive distortion a particular version of "the fallacy of composition," in this case the "idea that the economic agents tend to generalize locally valid views into invalid global statements."³³ But in his opinion, there is "no basis in [Marx's] work for suggesting different sorts of biases, or different frequency of bias, among the members of different classes."³⁴ Thus Elster's reading seems to suggest that all members of society, regardless of class position, are equally subject to cognitive distortions. Working-class membership would not therefore confer any epistemic advantage.

Now I think that this can fairly easily be demonstrated to be a misreading of Marx. As indicated earlier, Marx does believe that capitalism produces general "illusions," to which all classes are subject. To take a standard, frequently-cited example from *Capital*, the voluntaristic character of the transaction between worker and capitalist is an "illusory appearance" produced at the market level ("the sphere of simple circulation"), since here it seems that both parties to this transaction "are constrained only by their own free will."³⁵ And this "phenomenal form," the wage-form, constitutes, according to Marx, "the basis of all the juridical notions of both laborer and capitalist," and all the corresponding "illusions as to liberty."³⁶ Thus far one can agree with Elster: trans-class symmetry obtains. But the point is that this is only one doxastic tendency among others: within the pages of *Capital*, Marx also sketches for us the mechanisms of a countervailing, demystificatory tendency, which is class-specific rather than general. For in addition to the (common/"universal") experience of the deceptive equality of the market, the worker also has the (class-determined/"particular") experience of the economic constraints arising from the de facto capitalist monopoly of society's means of production, and the disillusioning experience of capitalist production itself. Thus the worker has spontaneously and directly available to him a conflicting set of experiences, which dramatically *undercuts* the voluntaristic and egalitarian appearance of the transaction, and which would, if followed up conceptually, lead in quite a different theoretical direction from the latter.³⁷ This would suggest that, because of their divergent experiences, the worker does in fact have

a cognitive advantage over the capitalist in understanding the workings of the "hidden structure" of the system. Thus the symmetry that exists between them experientially at the market level is absent at the deeper level of production.

But this account is not readily accommodated by Elster's reading of Marx. The capitalist may tend to globalize the locally valid by assuming (or, perhaps more accurately, not caring to think too much about it) that the worker enjoys the same material ("positive") freedom to enter or not enter the contractual relationship, but it would surely not be accurate to claim that the worker will be as prone (if at all) to do this. For the worker feels the material constraints directly--no speculation is needed. And this point is, of course, equally cogent for many other differences in their respective situations. It is not romanticizing the capacities of the downtrodden to observe that throughout the history of the struggles of subordinate groups, those at the bottom of the social ladder have usually shown themselves quite well aware that the conditions of their social superiors were different from their own. Indeed it is precisely the perception of this difference, and its assessment as unjust, that has often motivated such struggles in the first place.

Let us move on then to Elster's more general critique of social causation of "epistemologies." Elster suggests that the epistemic norm for which we should strive is "rationally grounded beliefs." These will, of course, not necessarily be true, but they have a better chance of being true than non-rationally grounded beliefs, being evidentially based. The presumption is that to be rationally grounded, the beliefs must be rationally caused, which means "(i) the causes of the belief are reasons for holding it and (ii) the reasons cause the beliefs *qua* reasons, not in some accidental manner."³⁸ One could, through non-rational causes, arrive at rationally grounded beliefs, but this would be fortuitous. Material interest and social position, however, are non-relevant causes: hence, Elster argues, "socially caused beliefs are not rationally caused."³⁹

Why does Elster see this as so self-evidently true? I think it is because he has the following picture of social causation in mind. Someone comes to believe that *p*, not through an objective investigation of the evidence for *p*, but because *p* "corresponds" to his

or her class interests. For example, a capitalist is receptive to some variety of libertarianism not because he has actually read Rand, Nozick, Machan, Friedman et al. and made some attempt to assess the merits of their arguments, but because he opposes further expansion of the social welfare system, and wants a philosophy that supports such views. In this kind of case, the causes of the belief are independent of the state of affairs the belief is about, so that we have no reason to think the belief is rationally grounded.

But the category of socially caused beliefs is certainly not exhausted by such examples. If workers, on the basis of their experiences in the factories, at the bargaining table, on the picket line, come to realize that the atomistic social ontology of liberalism is profoundly misleading, and that society is really divided into opposing classes; if women, on the basis of their experiences at work, on dates, on the streets at night, come to realize that the threat of rape by males is omnipresent and plays a major role in determining female behavior; if blacks, on the basis of their experiences with the educational system, the job market, the police, come to realize how pervasive, despite official denials, white racism continues to be; then in all these cases their beliefs surely do have an evidential base. Yet the preceding causal chains can all meaningfully be described as "social," since these experiences are more likely to arise in the lives of one social group than others. Elster's assumption seems to be that all social causal chains lack evidential links, but if this is not demonstrated it is merely a stipulative definition from which implications can be drawn only at the risk of circularity ("social causation is causation which does not involve rational causation and so is unlikely to produce rationally grounded beliefs").

What is obviously called for, then, is the drawing of internal distinctions between different varieties of social causation, according to their likelihood of producing positive or negative epistemic consequences.⁴⁰ Bloor and Barnes's "strong program" demands explanatory symmetry for both true and false beliefs, rejecting the notion that sociologists should be restricted to the elucidation of genealogies of error. The conclusions they draw from this are epistemologically relativist ones, the ubiquity of social causation allegedly dissolving the pretensions of any belief-set to

epistemically privileged status. But as several critics have argued, one can accept symmetry about the *fact* of causation while still rejecting it with respect to the *nature* of causation, and its probable differential consequences. W.H. Newton-Smith contrasts the cases of two people with particular beliefs about where they are sitting; only one of these people has operative perceptual facilities. In both cases, belief is the result of causal processes, but this symmetry does not extend deeper: "In the case of a veridical perceptual belief the causal chain involved runs through the state of affairs that gives the belief its truth-value. With non-veridical perceptual beliefs the causal chain may have nothing to do with the state of affairs that gives the belief its truth-value."⁴¹ In a parallel fashion, then, it can be argued that in the cases cited above it is the actual state of affairs which (differentially perceived) gives rise to the beliefs in particular social groups. Once we allow reasons to be causes, there is no contradiction in affirming that beliefs can be simultaneously socially and rationally caused.⁴²

4.

I want to show now how recent work in so-called "naturalized epistemology" may be of value in establishing an empirical basis for the above claims about hegemonic and alternative belief-systems. In his Introduction to *Naturalizing Epistemology*, Hilary Kornblith suggests that the inter-relations between three questions can be said to generate the project of naturalizing epistemology: "(1) How ought we to arrive at our beliefs? (2) How do we arrive at our beliefs? (3) Are the processes by which we do arrive at our beliefs the ones by which we ought to arrive at our beliefs?"⁴³ The strong version of what Kornblith calls "the replacement thesis" would simply dissolve (1) into (2). Since the advocates of alternative epistemologies want to challenge hegemonic, but mystifying, ideologies and belief-systems, they would obviously not want to give up the normative dimension of epistemology. A weaker version, however, in which psychological findings about belief-acquisition are deemed to be relevant to the erection of normative

standards, would not necessarily have this drawback, and indeed could be valuable in several ways.

First of all, the explicit connecting of the epistemological project to the ways in which people actually do acquire beliefs about the world can only be a positive corrective to the solipsist figure of the Cartesian knower. As the author of a book on the Marxist theory of knowledge has emphasized, "Knowledge is irreducibly *social*."⁴⁴ Similarly, Lorraine Code has pointed out that the misleading image of the "autonomous epistemic agent" needs to be replaced by the idea of "a community of knowers":

To a much greater extent than the examples commonly taken to illustrate epistemological points might lead one to believe, people are dependent, at a fundamental level, upon other people...for what they, often rightly, claim to know.... Far from being autonomous in the senses discussed above, knowledge is an interpersonal product that requires communal standards of affirmation, correction, and denial for its very existence. So a study of the workings of epistemic community is as important a focus of epistemological inquiry as is an analysis of perception- and memory-based knowledge claims.⁴⁵

And such a study could, of course, legitimately investigate subjects presently excluded from mainstream epistemology, such as the transmission of hegemonic ideologies to new members of the community. Similarly, the contextualization of the process of acquiring knowledge within a social matrix opens a theoretical space for the consideration of socially-generated illusions, in contrast to the wearying parade of elliptical coins, apparently-broken sticks, afterimages, color-varying objects, and all the other bric-a-brac of putatively problematic perceptual phenomena marched back and forth across the epistemological stage for the past few centuries. Finally, and linked to the preceding point, the findings of cognitive psychology about specific mechanisms of inferential distortion may be useful for translating into a twentieth-century terminology Marx's somewhat musty vocabulary of "appearance," "phenomenal form," and so on., as well as detailing cognitive mechanisms which he would not have had the theory to analyze himself. This would have the virtue of presenting Marx's claims in a framework more accessible to (and taken more seriously by)

a mainstream philosophical audience, a point of obvious importance if these ideas are ever to achieve de-ghettoization.

While there is no space to follow this program up here, I do want to give at least one concrete example to illustrate what I mean. In Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross's book on human inference, which is excerpted in the Kornblith collection, they argue that the evidence indicates that "people's understanding of the rapid flow of continuing social events" depends not so much on formal "judgmental procedures" as on "general knowledge [and--one wants to insert here--what is wrongly taken to be knowledge] of objects, people, events, and their characteristic relationships," which may be articulated both at the level of explicit propositional theory and as sub-propositional schematic cognitive structures, variously characterized by different authors as schemas/frames/scripts/nuclear scenes/prototypes. These provide an "interpretative framework for the lay scientist" and "supplement" the information given with much "assumed" information.⁴⁶

Now recent work in the Marxist theory of ideology, particularly that resulting from the influence of Gramsci, has emphasized that perhaps even more important than ideologies at the explicit and articulated level (for example, libertarianism, biological determinism) are ideologies in the more primeval sense of underlying patterns and matrices of belief, ideology as "common sense." For the former are at least visible as ideologies, specific demarcated bodies of thought in contestation for people's belief, while the latter may seem to be mere neutral background, an ideational framework to be accepted by all, without political implications. Thus the latter may well be more influential and efficacious than the former simply by virtue of their ability to set the terms of the debate, to limit the options which are deemed to be seriously worth discussing. (John McMurtry has argued that the "forms of social consciousness" Marx mentions in the 1859 Preface should be seen in this light, as the underpinnings of more explicit ideologies.⁴⁷) What the left must obviously do, then, is to establish a link between Nisbett and Ross's "schemas" and hegemonic ideological patterns, showing that in oppressive societies these "schemas" are often so structured as to convey misinformation. Thus the British authors of a book on how to understand racism and sexism emphasize that

these ideas should not be viewed as "abstract concepts" but as "lived experience":

For the racist, beliefs are not only cognitive categories or stereotypes--they represent a way of making sense and reacting to a range of social experiences. Ideology, in this sense, is not simply imposed from the outside by some super-powerful socialization agency; on the contrary, it is used by people to define their own lives and to understand the struggles and conflicts of the world they live in. In encountering Blacks, Jews, and other groups, the white worker...reproduces racism as a means of coping with the exigencies of the moment. It is easier to live with unemployment if you can account for it in terms of what appears to be an accessible explanation.⁴⁸

Correspondingly, the argument would be that in such interactions, those who are the victims of racism and sexism have, because of their differential experience, a better chance of developing schemas which objectively reflect the situation.

Consider, in this light, one of the most important schemas cited by Nisbett and Ross:

The most general and encompassing lay theory of human behavior--so broadly applied that it might more aptly be termed a "metatheory"--is the assumption that behavior is caused primarily by the enduring and consistent dispositions of the actor, as opposed to the particular characteristics of the situation to which the actor responds.... [I]n large measure the error, we suspect, lies in a very broad proposition about human conduct, to wit, that people behave as they do because of a general disposition to behave in the way that they do The "dispositionalist" theory, in short, is thoroughly woven into the fabric of our culture.⁴⁹

What we have here, it can be argued, is a statement in the framework of cognitive psychology of the general underlying pattern of what the left calls "blame-the-victim" theories.⁵⁰ Such theories come in both conservative (naturalistic/biological) and liberal (social/cultural) versions, but in both cases the focus is on the person's alleged deficiencies, whether these are seen to be genetic or environmental (for example, the "culture of poverty") in origin. The importance of this kind of psychological research is that it demonstrates that a plausible experiential base (Marx's "phenomenal forms") for such views can be established independently of any appeal to the role of hegemonic ideologies. Op-

pressive social structures constrain people into certain roles, narrow their choices, disable and restrict them in various ways, thereby creating apparent evidential support for negative dispositionalist accounts: low working-class IQ scores, under-representation of women and blacks in intellectual fields, the feminization and ethnicization of poverty. On the other hand, the subordinated social groups who have actually undergone the experience of trying to overcome the systemic roadblocks to their own development will be (as a result once again of social causation) in a better cognitive position to form true beliefs about the mechanisms of oppression, and more receptive to "situationist" accounts than hegemonic groups, to whom these constraints will be less visible.

5.

Finally, I want to say a few words about the inter-relations between these different "epistemologies."

For an older Marxism, of course, this problem would not have arisen in the first place. The presumed causal centrality of the capitalist system to all structures of oppression implied that the working-class vision, the proletarian perspective, was sufficiently comprehensive to encompass the viewpoints of all other oppressed groups. The phrase that has come to be used to describe these universalist pretensions is "class reductionism,"⁵¹ in this particular case the implication that the phenomenological specificities of women's and blacks' oppression can be assimilated to the working-class's experience of exploitation.

In response, socialist feminists have pointed to rape, wife-beating, sexual harassment, prostitution, objectification of female sexuality, domestic labor, and so on as phenomena which resist such assimilation, and which are not readily theorizable in orthodox Marxist categories. They have argued that Marx's notion of alienation is impoverished, and that the analysis of women's alienation would have to be extended to include alienation from one's sexuality and one's control of motherhood.⁵² Thus there are obviously many important experiences which do not, in the nor-

mal course of events, enter the phenomenological world of the male working-class. Perhaps the strongest piece of evidence in favor of the inadequacy of this perspective is that as Sandra Harding points out, it is only now, following the re-emergence of the women's movement, that the "sex/gender system" has become theoretically visible.⁵³

Similarly, for most of the twentieth century there has been an ongoing debate within the black liberation movement about the relationship between race and class, and the ability of Marxist concepts to explain black oppression.⁵⁴ The challenge to orthodox Marxist theory may be even stronger in this case, since there is not even an equivalent to Engels's book on the family, so that more than one theorist has concluded that: "Essentially, Marxism has no theory of nationalism."⁵⁵ Moreover, Marx and Engels themselves were influenced by Hegel's distinction between "world-historic" and "non-world-historic" peoples, "civilized" and "barbarian" nations, and they display a clear Eurocentricity in their writings about non-white peoples.⁵⁶ Accordingly, Cedric Robinson has recently argued that the racism that infects so much of Western thought is present in Marxist theory also, so that it would be a fundamental error to see it as "a *total* theory of liberation."⁵⁷ *Black Marxism*, the title of his book, is apparently cognate with "socialist feminism," but whereas socialist feminist critiques of orthodox Marxism (such as Jaggar's) use the (reconstructed) theory itself to criticize existing Marxism's conceptual lacunae, Robinson suggests that the African critique of Marxism would be more of an external critique, challenging Marxism from a position outside Western thought. For the "black experience" in this case starts from an ontological status of official non-personhood, and as such the "alienation" is more fundamental and far-reaching than anything that can be spun out of Marxist concepts of estrangement from one's product. In this spirit, the Jamaican sociologist Orlando Patterson has proposed the notion of "natal alienation," "the definition of the slave, however recruited, as a socially dead person": it goes directly to the heart of what is critical in the slave's forced alienation, the loss of ties of birth in both ascending and descending generations.... The slave was the ultimate human tool, as imprintable and as disposable as the master wished."⁵⁸ It may

be, then, that even a reconstructed Marxism will not have the theoretical resources to express this experience.

One reaction to this apparent failure of Marxism to live up to its promise of a genuinely unifying vision has been the embracing of a relativistic pluralism, the positing of multiple realities. This development is, of course, encouraged by a broader cultural trend in a number of different areas towards a skeptical relativism. Thus in a discussion of Sandra Harding's book on feminist epistemology, Alison Wylie suggests that Harding displays a systematic ambivalence, vacillating between post-modernist pluralism and "a variant of the enlightenment ideal of producing a unitary, authoritative conception of reality."⁵⁹ The latter is now seen in some quarters as itself politically dangerous, the "totalizing" vision necessarily leading (though this sometimes seems to be less argued for than derived by a kind of conceptual onomatopoeia) to "totalitarianism," the suppression of difference in the monofocal eye.⁶⁰

An obvious problem with this apparently democratic relativism is that if all viewpoints are equally validated, then there seems to be no reason why currently hegemonic perspectives (classist, sexist, racist) should not be similarly treated, and if a choice is then going to be made on non-evidential grounds, it is these perspectives which will have the advantages of tradition, widespread acceptance, privileged media dissemination, and so on. Moreover, alternative viewpoints themselves are to a significant extent constructed out of phenomenological raw material by intellectuals: "Those who construct the standpoint of women must begin from women's experience as women describe it, but they must go beyond that experience theoretically and ultimately may require that women's experience be redescribed."⁶¹ The decision to retain certain elements as theoretically significant while discarding others can only be made by appeal, implicit or explicit, to some set of normative criteria devised to guarantee objectivity and representativeness. Alternatively, if one wishes to invoke a democratic relativism here also, then what prevents the whole enterprise from degenerating into a multiplicity of individual viewpoints, so that the prized social dimension drops out, and we are left--as a *reduc-*

tio of the whole project--with those isolated Cartesian knowers again?

The temptations of relativism arise understandably out of the indubitable difficulty of trying to assemble class, race, and gender perspectives into some kind of coherent syncretic outlook. Moreover, as is often pointed out, an additional problem is that the positing of a "woman's perspective" (or a "working-class" or "black" perspective, for that matter) necessarily involves an artificial abstraction from other determinants. "[E]ven if one is always a man or a woman, one is never *just* a man or a woman. One is young or old, sick or healthy, married or unmarried, a parent or not a parent, employed or unemployed, middle class or working class, rich or poor, black or white, and so forth.... Experience does not come neatly in segments."⁶² Thus some critics have suggested that the whole enterprise is doomed from the start because of the actually fragmented and disjunctive character of what is being represented as unitary.⁶³ But even if it can be demonstrated that there is sufficient commonality of experience to justify the theoretical construction, the daunting task then remains of working out the epistemic implications of these overlaps and intersections of identity, which will entail that those who are oppressed in one context may be oppressors in another. Hence the retreat into a non-judgmental epistemic neutrality.

I would argue, though, that this very differentiation is what makes the retention of normativity all the more necessary. It is precisely because the working class Marx studied was not an abstraction, but a group composed largely of white males, that their subversive insight into the structure of social oppression (and the Marxist theory derived from it) was only partial. A woman's perspective was required to uncover the significance of rape as a sustaining mechanism of patriarchal repression. But because the women who developed this analysis were themselves largely white, they in turn tended to miss the particular historical significance of the rape accusation when made against black men by white women. Again, therefore, a theoretical corrective was necessary, this time in the form of the critique of white, middle-class feminist theory by black, working-class women.⁶⁴ Putting these all on the same epistemic plane, it seems to me, contradicts the evi-

dent truth that in each case a better approximation to the actual holistic reality of the situation is being achieved. An account of social subordination which does not draw on the experiences of women and blacks is simply theoretically weaker than one which does.

For the past century, Marxism has been the most powerful theory of the dialectic of social oppression. It is now obvious that this oppression is multi-dimensional, and that the historical forces which produced Marxism as a theory have now thrown up other perspectives, other visions, illuminating aspects of the structured dark-nesses of society that Marx himself failed to see. What we need to work towards is a synthesis of these alternative epistemologies, which recognizes both the multiplicity and the unity, the experiential subjectivity and the causal objectivity, of hierarchical class-, gender-, and race-divided society.

Notes

1. For some recent discussions, see, for example: Lorraine B. Code, "Is the Sex of the Knower Epistemologically Significant?", *Metaphilosophy*, 12 (1981): 267-76; Alan Soble, "Feminist Epistemology and Women Scientists," *Metaphilosophy*, 14 (1983): 291-307; Sandra Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka, eds., *Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983), especially the essays by Jane Flax, Nancy Hartsock, and Sandra Harding; Alison M. Jaggar, *Feminist Politics and Human Nature* (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld, 1983), especially chapter 11; Jean Grimshaw, *Philosophy and Feminist Thinking* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986); Sandra Harding, *The Science Question in Feminism* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986); Marsha Hanen and Kai Nielsen, eds., *Science, Morality and Feminist Theory, Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, Supplementary Volume 13 (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1987).
2. See, for example: the special double issue of *The Philosophical Forum* on "Philosophy and the Black Experience," 9 (Winter-Spring 1977-78); Leonard Harris, ed., *Philosophy Born of Struggle: Anthology of Afro-American Philosophy from 1917* (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Co., 1983); Howard McGary, Jr., "Teaching Black Philosophy," *Teaching Philosophy* 7 (1984): 129-37.
3. In his 1986 statistical profile of the American Philosophical Association (APA) membership, compiled from responses on renewal notices, David Hoekema reports that of the 2961 philosophers who responded (a 48%

response rate), only 35 identified themselves as black. He emphasizes that a substantial number of people (719) failed to answer the question on minority status, but the lowness of the figure seem significant nonetheless. Of these 35, only 3 were women. See *Proceedings and Addresses of the APA* 59 (1986): 717-23. Similarly, an APA survey on member departments yielded the information that in 1985 blacks earned only 1% of the PhDs in philosophy, by comparison with a 3.3% rate for PhDs generally. See *Proceedings and Addresses of the APA*, 61 (1987): 357-60. As with any other complex social phenomenon, racism is sustained by a plurality of causes. Thus a past history of racist practices (like the response given to the black philosopher Broadus Butler in 1952 when he applied for a job at a "white" university: "Why don't you go where you will be among your own kind?"--cited by Harris, p. ix) obviously has a "bleaching" effect on the discipline that tends to perpetuate itself in other ways, since traditional philosophy in the academy--the ivory tower's ivory tower--then seems completely remote from black concerns and interests, thus failing to attract potential graduate students. Richard Wasserstrom's 1987 presidential address to the APA Pacific Division shows a praiseworthy sensitivity to these points: see *Proceedings and Addresses of the APA*, supplement to 61 (1987): 27-42. It is clearly significant that both McGary's and Harris's bibliographies have so few listings for philosophy journals, and that many of the most prominent black thinkers cited are not academic philosophers, at least as narrowly defined.

4. The classic example of such an interpretation, of course, is George Lukács's *History and Class Consciousness*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (1968, Berlin; Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1971). See especially "Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat," pp. 83-222.
5. See Jaggar, *Feminist Politics and Human Nature*, chapter 11.
6. David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), p. 216.
7. Hume, p. 269.
8. Soble, "Feminist Epistemology and Women Scientists," pp. 294ff.
9. Jaggar, *Feminist Politics and Human Nature*, pp. 366-67.
10. Harding, *Science Question*, pp. 179-82.
11. Abiola Irele, Introduction to Paulin J. Hountondji, *African Philosophy: Myth and Reality*, trans. Henri Evans and Jonathan Ree (1976, Paris; rpt. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983), p. 18.
12. Harding, *Science Question*, p. 179.
13. Irele, *African Philosophy: Myth and Reality*, p. 21.
14. See Code, "Is the Sex of the Knower Epistemologically Significant?", and also Steven Rose, Leon J. Kamin and R.C. Lewontin, *Not In Our Genes: Biology, Ideology and Human Nature* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984), chapter 6.
15. See Code, pp. 270-71, and Rose et al., chapter 6.
16. Harding, *Science Question*, chapter 6.
17. For a detailed account of such an interpretation, see Russell Keat and John Urry, *Social Theory as Science*, 2nd ed. (1975; reprint London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982).

18. See the discussions in Jarrett Leplin, ed. *Scientific Realism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
19. See, for example, Barry Barnes, *Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974) and David Bloor, *Knowledge and Social Imagery* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976).
20. Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1 (New York: International Publishers, 1967), pp. 59-60.
21. The concept of "socio-economic determination" in Marx is often treated monolithically, without sensitivity to possible internal differentiations. For a detailed analysis of the main determinants that I think should be distinguished, and suggestions as to how this approach may clear up some traditional problems in Marx interpretation, see my "Determination and Consciousness in Marx," in Kai Nielsen and Rober Ware, eds., *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, Supplementary Volume 14 (forthcoming).
22. Jaggar, *Feminist Politics and Human Nature*, p. 6.
23. Jaggar, p. 370.
24. Jon Elster, "Belief, Bias and Ideology," in Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes, eds., *Rationality and Relativism* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982), p. 131.
25. Soble, "Feminist Epistemology and Women Scientists," p. 302
26. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, vol. 3 (New York: International Publishers, 1975), p. 186.
27. Joseph McCarney, "Recent Interpretations of Ideology," *Economy and Society* 14 (1985): 89-90.
28. Jon Elster, *Making Sense of Marx* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
29. Bhikhu Parekh, *Marx's Theory of Ideology* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), pp. 18-19.
30. Sandra Harding, "Ascetic Intellectual Opportunities: Reply to Alison Wylie," in Hanen and Nielsen, *Science, Morality and Feminist Theory*, p. 77.
31. Ralph Ellison, *Invisible Man*, 30th Anniversary Edition (1952; rpt. New York: Random House, 1982), p. 13.
32. Elster discusses "hot" and "cold" mechanisms of cognitive distortion in *Making Sense of Marx*, pp. 18-22.
33. Elster, p. 19.
34. Elster, p. 19.
35. Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, p. 176.
36. Marx, pp. 539-40.
37. See, for example, G.A. Cohen, "The Structure of Proletarian Unfreedom," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12 (1983): 3-33.
38. Elster, *Making Sense*, p. 474.
39. Elster, p. 474.
40. See note 21, above.
41. W.H. Newton-Smith, *The Rationality of Science* (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), p. 253.

42. See the discussion of Warren Schmaus, "Reasons, Causes, and the 'Strong Programme' in the Sociology of Knowledge," *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 15 (1985): 189-96.
43. Hilary Kornblith, ed., *Naturalizing Epistemology* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987), p.1.
44. David-Hillel Ruben, *Marxism and Materialism: A Study in Marxist Theory of Knowledge*, 2nd ed. (1977; rpt. Sussex and New Jersey: Harvester and Humanities Press, 1979), p. 109.
45. Lorraine Code, "Second Persons," in Hanen and Nielsen, *Science, Morality and Feminist Theory*, pp. 374-75, 377-78.
46. Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross, *Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgement* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1983); excerpted in Kornblith, p. 200.
47. John McMurtry, *The Structure of Marx's World-View* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), chapter 6.
48. Arthur Brittan and Mary Maynard, *Sexism, Racism and Oppression* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), p. 183.
49. Nisbett and Ross, in Kornblith, *Naturalizing Epistemology*, pp. 202-203.
50. William Ryan, *Blaming the Victim*, 2nd ed. (1972; rpt. New York: Vintage Books, 1976).
51. For a good discussion, see Frank Cunningham, *Democratic Theory and Socialism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), chapter 9.
52. Jaggar, *Feminist Politics and Human Nature*, pp. 307-17.
53. Sandra Harding, "Why Has the Sex/Gender System Become Visible Only Now?", in Harding and Hintikka, *Discovering Reality*, pp. 311-24.
54. For some discussions, see, for example: Cedric J. Robinson, *Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition* (London: Zed Press, 1983); Manning Marable, "Black Studies: Marxism and the Black Intellectual Tradition," in Bertell Ollman and Edward Vernoff, eds., *The Left Academy: Marxist Scholarship on American Campuses*, vol. 3 (New York: Praeger, 1986), pp. 35-66; Bernard R. Boxill, "The Race-Class Questions," and Lucius T. Outlaw, "Race and Class in the Theory and Practice of Emancipatory Social Transformation," both in Harris, *Philosophy Born of Struggle*, pp. 107-16 and 117-29.
55. Ronaldo Munck, *The Difficult Dialogue: Marxism and Nationalism* (London: Zed Books, 1986), p. 2. See also Ephraim Nimni, "Marxism and Nationalism," in Martin Shaw, ed., *Marxist Sociology Revisited: Critical Assessments* (London: Macmillan, 1985), pp. 99-142.
56. See Nimni, and Munck, chapter 1.
57. Robinson, *Black Marxism*, p. 451.
58. Orlando Patterson, *Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. 5-7.
59. Alison Wylie, "The Philosophy of Ambivalence: Sandra Harding on *The Science Question in Feminism*," in Hanen and Nielsen, *Science, Morality and Feminist Theory*, p. 65.
60. See, for example, Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg, eds., *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988), where this connection seems to be taken for granted in several of the articles.

61. Jaggar, *Feminist Politics and Human Nature*, p. 384.
62. Grimshaw, *Philosophy and Feminist Thinking*, pp. 84-85.
63. See Soble, "Feminist Epistemology and Women Scientists."
64. See, for example: Angela Davis, *Women, Race and Class* (New York: Random House, 1981), especially chapter 11, which discusses Susan Brownmiller's well-known book on rape, *Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1975); Bell Hooks, *Ain't I a Woman: Black Women and Feminism* (Boston: South End Press, 1981); Gloria T. Hull, Patricia Bell Scott, and Barbara Smith, eds., *All the Women Are White, All the Blacks Are Men, But Some of Us Are Brave: Black Women's Studies* (Old Westbury, New York: The Feminist Press, 1982).

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